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 Abstract 
 
In spite of there being few elements of tax or cash benefit systems in developed countries that 
are any longer explicitly gender-biased in a discriminatory sense, it is well recognised that 
they have significant gender effects. To the extent that women earn less than men on average 
under tax-benefit systems that are progressive, there is some redistribution from men to 
women overall. However, an aggregate perspective is insufficient for understanding how 
earning opportunities and public policies affect living arrangements at the family level in 
general and the circumstances of men and women in particular. Arguably, it is within the 
household that a gendered division of labour is most relevant. It is difficult to observe how 
income and other resources get allocated within households. We can, however, observe the 
incomes brought into the household and to what extent taxes and benefits mitigate (or indeed 
exacerbate) any inequality of income between men and women. We explore the effects of tax 
and benefit systems on differences in income and in incentives to earn income between men 
and women within couples in a selection of the member countries of the European Union 
(EU) using EUROMOD, the EU tax-benefit microsimulation model. This comparative per-
spective allows us to establish the relative effects of different policy regimes, given the under-
lying characteristics of each national population, using a consistent approach and set of inci-
dence assumptions across countries. 
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1. Motivation 
In spite of there being few elements of tax or cash benefit
1 systems in developed countries 
that are any longer explicitly gender-biased in a discriminatory sense, it is well recognised 
that they have significant gender effects. Policies that compensate for time spent in 
childbearing or caring may at the same time reduce womens’ incentives to earn an 
independent income. Partly because of their caring roles women earn less than men, on 
average. So, to the extent that the combined effects of tax-benefit systems are progressive and 
therefore reduce income inequalities, they result in redistribution from men to women in 
aggregate. However, an aggregate perspective is insufficient for understanding how earning 
opportunities and public policies affect living arrangements at the family level in general and 
the circumstances of men and women in particular. Arguably, it is within the household that a 
gendered division of labour is most relevant and this paper focuses on the relative situation of 
the individuals in male-female co-resident couple relationships. 
The effects of public policies on income inequality within couples operate both through 
access  to income (and hence consumption) and potential  access to independent (earned) 
income, through work incentives. Of course, public policies also influence other inequalities 
within the household – notably those related to the use of time and the influence over 
decision-making in all spheres. This influence may be indirect, through inequalities in income 
and work incentives, which are the subjects of this paper. Or it may be through other 
mechanisms, which are beyond its scope.  
It is difficult to observe how resources get allocated within households. We can, however, 
observe the incomes brought into the household and to what extent taxes and benefits mitigate 
(or indeed exacerbate) any inequality of income between men and women. The within-
household redistributive effect is particularly relevant when the assumption of income pooling 
in the couple does not hold. Indeed this assumption has been often rejected empirically: the 
degree of control that a partner has on the household income affects the composition of the 
household consumption set (Browning and Bonke, 2006; Ermish and Pronzato, 2007). We 
can pose the question as: how much does the tax-benefit system contribute to the equalisation 
                                                 
1 “Benefit” is here used in its European sense of a cash transfer from the state. It is a term that includes 
contributory earnings replacement insurance payments, payments to compensate for contingencies such as 
disability, payments to support children and families, means-tested social assistance or welfare payments and 
“in-work” subsidies of low earnings.    2 
of the distribution of resources between men and women and hence the within-household 
distribution of welfare? 
On the other hand, if we do accept the pooling hypothesis as is conventionally done – for the 
sake of convenience rather than conviction – in the measurement of income inequality or 
poverty, then the equalising effect of taxes and benefits is still informative. It tells us how 
much of the within-household redistribution that is implied by pooling is accomplished 
through the tax-benefit system and how much (by implication) by intra-household transfers 
between men and women themselves. 
We explore these questions for working age couples in nine of the member countries of the 
European Union (EU) using EUROMOD, the EU tax-benefit microsimulation model.
2  
This comparative perspective allows us to explore the relative effects of different policy 
regimes, given the underlying characteristics of each national population, while using a 
consistent approach and set of incidence assumptions across countries. The within-household 
equalising properties of tax-benefit systems are compared for particular types of couple and in 
terms of the influence of different types of policy instrument.  
 Depending on how they are implemented, redistributive policies can alter work incentives 
and, hence, participation in the labour market. A huge amount of research has been done on 
the trade-off between redistribution and behavioural distortions (for an example using 
EUROMOD, see Immervoll et al. (2007)). Yet, there is much less empirical work on the 
importance of any such trade-off within households. What is the potential effect on activity 
patterns of tax and transfer policies that serve to reduce gender inequalities? From a gender 
equity perspective this is a crucial question. Tax-benefit systems that reduce income 
inequalities within couples may, at the same time, have the effect of reducing the lower 
earner’s incentive to earn an independent income. Whether this is the case, and the extent it is 
so across country and by types of couple is explored in the second part of this paper using a 
range of indicators of work incentives for working-age men and women. Results take into 
account the full range of relevant direct taxes and cash benefits. They show whether and to 
what extent women in couples face lower incentives to work than their male partners and how 
                                                 
2 See http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/ and Sutherland (2007) or Lietz and Mantovani (2007) for more 
information.    3 
these patterns are associated with the (within-household) redistributive properties of tax-
benefit systems in each country.  
The next section explains how incomes and work incentives have been measured and this is 
followed in section 3 by a description of the data and methods used, together with more 
detailed description of how income components are allocated to individuals. Section 4 
quantifies inequalities in independent income received by men and women in couples in the 
nine countries considered and the following section explores the corresponding inequalities in 
income after the operation of the tax and benefit systems. In section 6 the equalising 
properties of four main components of these systems (income taxes, social contributions, 
means-tested and non means-tested benefits) are explored. Section 7 quantifies for two-earner 
couples the within-couple differences in the incentives to increase income from paid work. 
Section 8 explores, for a selection of countries, the incentives of women in couples with 
earning partners to take paid work themselves. The final section concludes by considering 
whether there is a trade-off in the extent of the within couple difference in work incentives 
and the way in which tax-benefit systems reduce inequalities in income within couples. Do 
tax-benefit systems reduce income inequalities at the expense of increasing disparities in 
incentives to earn independent income?  
2. Measuring redistribution and differential incentives within couples 
The first aim is to quantify the difference in independent income brought into the household 
by male and female partners in couples and then to measure by how much any gap is closed 
due to the operation of the tax system on those incomes, and due to the payment of benefits to 
either member of the couple or to the couple jointly. We consider “independent” income to be 
own current earned income and income from capital as well as any transfers from other 
households.
3 The “redistribution” is considered to be achieved through the operation of 
income taxes and other direct personal taxes, employee and self-employed social insurance 
contributions, and contributory and non-contributory benefit payments. Of course, 
contributions and contributory benefits, particularly pensions, do not simply have the function 
of redistributing between persons. They also re-distribute individual income over each 
person’s lifecycle. However, it would be misleading to downplay or ignore them in this 
context. Not only do they have some intra-personal redistribution role through their social 
                                                 
3 Mainly maintenance and alimony payments.   4 
protection function, but also they may reflect or recognise gender differences in particular 
ways. For example, maternity benefits are not usually financed through higher social 
contributions made by women. Our analysis accounts for this as a “plus” for women’s 
incomes compared with men’s. It also distinguishes between the equalising effects of 
contributory and non-contributory benefits and between the effects of contributions and 
income taxes so that the between-person redistributive functions of contributory systems can 
be identified separately. The analysis focuses on working age couples, which is consistent 
with our interest in work incentives, and also avoids the need to consider how to treat derived 
rights pensions in this framework. The inclusion of contributions but not pensions means that 
our analysis is partial at the aggregate level. 
Our “outcome” measure is disposable income: that is gross market income less income taxes 
and contributions, plus cash benefits. Since this ignores the incidence of some other taxes as 
well as spending on non-cash benefits, it does not provide a comprehensive picture at the 
couple level either. In international comparative perspective this matters to some extent as the 
balance between cash and non-cash spending and between direct and indirect or personal and 
corporate taxation varies across countries. Nevertheless, the use of household disposable 
income as the measuring stick for this study provides a useful link to studies of poverty and 
income distribution which often also use this concept. 
In this study we allocate incomes, taxes and benefits to individuals within households. Some 
assumptions have to be made, particularly in relation to benefits paid for children or the 
family as a whole, and in relation to joint taxation. These are discussed in detail in the next 
section. Our samples of couples are selected to exclude cases where there are other adults 
with income from any source in the household. This is so that household disposable income 
can be fully allocated to the members of the couple and our analysis can be in terms of shares 
of female (or male) income - or income component - in the household total. Our basic 
measure of income distribution within a couple is the share of the woman’s income in the 
total.
4 If this is closer to 50% after taxes and benefits than before, then we consider that the 
tax-benefit system has an equalising function. The size of the increase is a measure of the 
scale of the redistribution. 
                                                 
4 Jansson (1996) uses the same measure for a study of redistribution within Swedish households.    5 
In order to assess the effect of the tax-benefit system on differential incentives to work for 
men and women in couples we make use of three indicators. Work incentives are usually 
measured in terms of the amount of household net income gained following a change in 
earnings by one or other individual. The change may be a small addition to existing earnings, 
capturing the incentive to work a bit longer, a bit harder or at a higher wage rate (the intensive 
margin), or it may be an increase in earnings equivalent to that on entry into work (the 
extensive margin). In this paper we consider two types of intensive margin for couples where 
both are in paid work. The first corresponds to a small proportional increase (3%) in existing 
labour market effort and the second to an increase in individual work effort such that couple 
disposable income increases by 10%. At the extensive margin we focus on women with 
partners in work to assess the incentives to take paid work themselves.  
3. Methods, data and assumptions 
Our analysis makes use of EUROMOD, which simulates tax liabilities and benefit 
entitlements for the household populations of EU Member States. A microsimulation 
approach is necessary because information on taxes and contributions is not always present in 
the household micro-data sources that are available for these countries. Importantly, the 
combination of micro-data with a model of tax and benefit rules in a microsimulation model 
can be used to compute Marginal Effective Tax Rates (METRs) and Participation Tax Rates 
(PTRs), which are not observed in micro-data. By varying each observation’s incomes by a 
certain amount and then re-computing tax liabilities and benefit entitlements, the effective tax 
burden on any additional income can be captured.  
In this paper we include a selection of nine countries: Austria (AT), Finland (FI), France 
(FR), Germany (GE), Greece (GR), Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT) and the 
UK. The calculations are based on the datasets shown in Table A1 of the Appendix, updated 
to 2001 incomes, prices and tax-benefit systems.
5  
                                                 
5 EUROMOD relies on micro-data from twelve different sources for fifteen countries. The datasets used in this 
paper are the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) User Data Base made available by Eurostat; the 
Austrian version of the ECHP made available by the Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the 
Social Sciences; the Income Distribution Survey made available by Statistics Finland; the Enquête sur les 
Budgets Familiaux (EBF) made available by INSEE; the public use version of the German Socio Economic 
Panel Study (GSOEP) made available by the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin; the 
Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW95) made available by the Bank of Italy; the Socio-Economic 
Panel Survey (SEP) made available by Statistics Netherlands through the mediation of the Netherlands 
Organisation for Scientific Research - Scientific Statistical Agency; and the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), 
made available by the UK Office for National Statistics (ONS) through the Data Archive. Material from the FES 
is Crown Copyright and is used by permission. Neither the ONS nor the Data Archive bears any responsibility   6 
In each country we select all couples living in the same household where both are under age 
65 and neither is receiving income from old age pensions. We exclude those sharing 
households with other adults. We define other adults as people aged over 25, or those between 
16 and 25 who have their own sources of income, who are not in couples themselves and who 
do not have their own children. Table 1 shows how many such couples are in the datasets and 
what proportion this sub-set is of all households and all couples in each dataset. There are 
differences across countries in the relative size of the subset: in the Netherlands the couples 
we focus on make up 70% of all couples, whereas in Portugal the proportion is as low as 
43%. The propensity to live in couples at all will vary, as will the prevalence of sharing 
households with grown up children or elderly relatives. Decisions about household formation 
are choices which are influenced by, among very many things, the incentives and support 
offered by tax and benefit systems. Thus our selection criteria may to some extent bias the 
comparisons that are made of the effects of tax-benefit systems within couples.
6 This should 
be borne in mind when interpreting results.  
Table 1 shows more information about the samples of couples which turns out to be quite 
consistent with stylised facts about the countries concerned. In Greece they are more likely to 
be older, to have children, for the woman to not have her own earnings and to be legally 
married than in other countries; in Finland they are much less likely to be married, are among 
the youngest and have the highest rate of both partners earning (85%). Greece and Italy have 
the lowest rate of cohabitation (1%) and also low rates of both partners earning (38% and 
48% respectively). The UK sample has the highest rate of workless couples (11%) and a high 
rate of cohabitation. Both UK and the Netherlands have higher than average propensities for 
the woman to be the sole earner (7% and 5% respectively) and the Netherlands, like the UK 
also has a high proportion of unmarried couples. Portugal and Germany both have high rates 
of both partners earning (71% and 73% respectively) although the proportion of Portuguese 
sample couples with children is relatively high (66%) and the corresponding proportion in the 
German sample is the lowest in all countries considered (49%). France is another country 
with a relatively high rate of unmarried couples whereas Austria has the lowest rate among 
the non-Southern countries (12%) as well as a relatively low rate of employment by the 
woman in couples. 
                                                                                                                                                          
for the analysis or interpretation of the data reported here. An equivalent disclaimer applies for all other data 
sources and their respective providers cited in this acknowledgement. 
6 Bonke (2006) makes a similar choice of sample.   7 
When calculating marginal effective tax rates, the samples are further reduced to only include 
couples where both are in current paid work. In practice this is complicated by the fact that 
most of the datasets record incomes for the past year and because an individual’s employment 
status can change during this year. Those who have any receipt of out-of-work benefits or 
earnings below a low threshold (30 euro per month) are excluded on the basis that they 
probably were only working part of the year. 
Incomes are allocated to individuals in the following ways: 
•  Independent incomes are allocated depending on who earns or receives them. This applies 
to gross earnings from employment and self-employment, income from capital and any 
private pension income paid to the people included in our sample, as well as transfers 
received from other households. We also refer to this as pre- tax-benefit income. 
•  Benefits received by individuals to compensate for individual risks such as maternity or 
unemployment or individual contingencies such as own disability are allocated to the 
individual concerned. These may be means-tested (on individual income or assets) but 
typically are not.  
•  Benefits intended for the support of dependent children or for the family as a whole are 
split in half between the couple. These benefits include child and family benefits, whether 
means-tested or not, social assistance and other means-tested support, including in-work 
benefits, housing benefits. Of course, this assumption of an equal split does not 
necessarily reflect what happens in practice and ignores the fact that children have a claim 
on resources within the household. However, it is an assumption that is transparent and in 
the absence of other information about the sharing of benefit incomes, this seems 
reasonable.
7 Within this category benefits are divided into those that are non-means-tested 
and those that are means-tested.  
                                                 
7 This results in an allocation that is somewhere between the usual complete sharing assumption and the opposite 
extreme of assuming that income is retained by those who receive it. The latter way of allocating income has 
been used by Sutherland (1997) for the UK and Fritzell (1999) for Sweden. It would be interesting to explore 
the implications of this approach in comparative perspective. However, this is not straightforward for two 
reasons. First, detailed national knowledge about the payment of benefits in each country would be required. 
Secondly, the issues raised by joint taxation – not relevant in the UK or Sweden and discussed below - would 
need to be resolved.    8 
•  Social contributions are generally levied on individual incomes and so are allocated to 
that individual. 
•  The allocation of income taxes depends on whether the tax system is based on individual 
or joint assessment. In the case of individual taxation, the tax is allocated to the individual 
concerned. In the case of joint taxation – usually only of married couples - the tax is 
allocated in proportion to taxable income. This is a rather strong assumption, but the one 
conventionally used and necessary since we have no evidence on how joint tax liability is 
actually split between the couple. Typically what happens in practice is that they will each 
pay some amount of withholding tax deducted from earnings (and, in some cases, other 
income sources) during the year. There will be an end-of-year retrospective reconciliation 
which will involve some refund or extra payment. How this is transferred into or out of 
the household and how it is shared within the household will depend on many factors, not 
least the mode of tax administration. Indeed, arguably it may be income after the tax is 
deducted at source (typically before the operation of the joint system) that is critical to the 
day-to-day resource division within the household, rather than the final liability. What 
actually happens at the end-of-year adjustment stage when sometimes significant 
rebalancing must take place would be an interesting matter for study. The proportional 
assumption that we employ has the effect of reducing the within- married couple 
equalising properties of income tax to those that arise from the extent to which taxable 
income is distinct from total individual independent income. However, it is difficult to 
construct an alternative that is plausible across all types of joint taxation.
8 In some 
countries couples can choose whether to be taxed separately or together and we assume 
that the couple chooses the option that minimises their joint tax. This may not always 
happen, in fact, but our data do not allow us to identify directly couples’ choices in this 
respect.  
                                                 
8 One alternative way of allocating joint tax would be to assume that each individual would pay the amount 
equivalent to the individual taxation minus an equal share of the “joint taxation benefit” (i.e. what they save 
from being taxed jointly).   9 
4. Inequalities in individual independent income 
The extent to which sharing of income resources needs to take place within households 
depends, among other things, on inequalities in independent income. Table 2 shows the 
average share of couple pre- tax-benefit income received by women, overall and in each 
quintile group of the couple disposable income distribution.
9 The share overall ranges from 
18% in Greece to 37% in Finland. In all countries considered on average the male partner has 
higher pre- tax-benefit income than the female. However this is not the case for all 
individuals. In Finland and the UK the woman has the higher income in around a quarter of 
the couples we consider. The proportion is half this size in Austria, Greece and Italy (last row 
of Table 2).  
Three factors in combination can explain why the average share is less than 50% in all cases 
and why there is variation in the share across countries. First, not all women in couples have 
any independent income of their own, due mainly to their non-participation in paid work. The 
rate of non-participation by women (where her partner is in work) varies from 58% in Greece 
to less than 10% in Finland (Table 1). Secondly, for couples with both partners in paid work, 
lower hours of work and/or lower female wages will contribute to lowering women’s share. 
Finally, the “pairing” of male and female independent incomes within couples across 
countries will vary. In some cases – particularly those where part time working by women 
after marriage or motherhood is prevalent – relatively high earning males may be paired with 
relatively low earning females. In other cases differences in the level of earnings between 
partners may be in line with average male-female earnings differences generally.  
In most countries the average share of the woman clearly rises with household income but this 
is not the case in the UK, nor very clearly the case in Finland. In France, Portugal, Italy and 
Germany, the women’s share is lower in the top quintile than in the next quintile down.  
The lower share of women’s incomes is driven to a large extent by their lower earnings and 
the cross-country differences in this respect are indicated by comparing the quintile points of 
                                                 
9 Here, household disposable incomes are equivalised in order to calculate quintile points. Although we only 
consider couple households, some have children and some do not, so equivalisation is necessary to account for 
different needs. We use the modified OECD equivalence scale. The quintile points are shown in Appendix table 
A2.   10 
the female and male earnings distributions (Appendix table A2).
10 Female earnings are lower 
at all four points in the distributions in all countries, reflecting lower wage rates, lower 
working hours, or both. The least unequal countries overall are Portugal followed by Italy, 
France and then Greece and Finland. So while participation rates of women are low in Greece 
and, to a lesser extent, in Italy, the earnings of women who do work in these countries are 
relatively close to men’s earnings. In all countries except Portugal the situation is particularly 
extreme at the bottom quintile. In Germany, the Netherlands and Austria, the 20% of working 
women with the lowest earnings earn less than one third of the lowest-earning group of men.  
Table 2 also shows the share of independent income received by women according to 
quintiles of male and female earnings respectively. Not surprisingly, the female shares in 
couples without female earnings are very low – although they amount to 6% in the UK and 
8% in Finland. For couples without male earnings female shares are of course much higher 
than average. However, they are not the mirror image of the couples with no female earnings 
– between 52% (in the Netherlands) and 11% (in Austria) of the couple income is on average 
received by the man, even though he is not earning. Clearly, there are within couple gender 
inequalities in income sources apart from earnings. The importance of cases with only one 
earner in the calculation of women’s share overall varies across countries (Table 1). The 
effect of the low share of income for non-earning women is particularly strong in countries 
with high proportions of couples with only the man earning: Greece followed by Italy and 
Austria. The effect of the high shares accorded to women in couples with only female 
earnings will be smaller in general, because of the low occurrence of this type of couple, but 
will have some effect in pushing up the overall share in UK and the Netherlands.
11 
If men and women were paired into couples according to their gender-specific earnings 
quintile then we would expect to see no change in women’s mean share across earnings 
quintiles. However, there is a clear positive gradient in all countries for the effect of female 
earnings level on the female share of income. There is a less clear inverse relationship 
between the male level of earnings and the female share. In Portugal the female share is 
                                                 
10 The quintiles are calculated for the members of couples in our samples, not for the male and female earnings 
distributions as a whole. In calculating quintiles, individuals with earnings of less than 30 euro per month are 
excluded. These, together with people with no earnings are shown in a separate category. 
11 It should be noted that in cases where the couple has no pre-tax and benefit income at all it is not possible to 
calculate the share of female income. These couples are excluded from the share calculation where this is the 
case. The numbers affected range from 6% of all couples in the UK to less than 1% in Finland and Germany. 
They are nearly all located in the bottom quintile group of household disposable income.    11 
almost independent of the male earnings quintile and the relationship is also rather flat in the 
lower half of the male earnings distribution in France and in the middle in Greece.  
5. The within-couple redistributive effects of tax-benefit systems 
The effect of the tax-benefit systems in reducing the average inequality between men and 
women in couples is illustrated by comparing the shares of disposable income received by 
women (Table 3) with the shares of independent pre-tax-benefit income, shown in Table 2.  
Figure 1 summarises the differences by showing women’s mean share before the tax-benefit 
system (pale section of the bars) with the equalising effect of taxes and benefits shown as the 
darker additional sections of the bars. The countries are ranked by the size of the proportional 
increase in share due to the impact of the tax-benefit system. 
In all countries, tax-benefit systems are shown to reduce within-couple income inequalities on 
average. The Austrian tax-benefit system achieves the greatest proportional increase in 
equality within couples and this is partly a product of the pre-tax-benefit share of income 
being the second lowest out of the nine countries considered. The absolute increase in 
women’s income share is, however, also highest in Austria (4.1 percentage points), followed 
by Finland (3.8), the UK (3.2) and France (3.1). Greece is the least equal before the effects of 
the tax-benefit system which itself makes little difference. The equalising effect of the 
German and Portuguese systems are also small (1.4 and 1.3 respectively) and that of the 
Netherlands and Italy are intermediate (2.5 and 2.0 respectively). Figure 2 summarises the 
differences across countries in the average extent of equalisation, given the level of within-
couple inequality in pre-tax benefit incomes. The mean of the women’s share of pre-tax-
benefit income is plotted against the share after the tax-benefit system. Markers above the 45 
degree line indicate that tax-benefit systems reduce within-couple gender inequality on 
average. Of course there is some variation within these averages and the relative size of this is 
indicated in Figure 2 by “error” bars showing the coefficient of variation around the mean 
pre- and post- shares of income. Indeed, the overall equalising effect obscures the fact that in 
all countries, while the majority of couples do see some shift from man to woman (between 
80% of couples in Austria and 58% in Italy), for a significant minority the tax-benefit system 
reduces the female share or has no effect on the share (Table 4). In some countries the 
proportion for whom the female share falls corresponds closely to the proportion of couples 
where the woman has the higher pre- tax-benefit income (see Table 2): Austria, Finland,   12 
France, Greece and Portugal. Equalisation is taking place, but from woman to man. In 
Germany, Italy and the Netherlands the tax benefit system reduces the female share of income 
in some couples where the woman does not have the larger share (Table 4). This happens in 
14% of couples in Germany and Italy and 5% in the Netherlands. 
The mean equalising effects are systematically larger, both in proportion and in absolute 
terms for couples with low income: Figure 3 shows the same information as Figure 1, but for 
couples in the bottom quintile group by disposable income. For this group, France has the 
most equalising properties, and Greece, again, the least. With the exception of Finland and the 
UK, pre- tax-benefit incomes are distributed much less equally for low income couples than 
for couples as a whole (in the case of the UK the relative degree of equality within low 
income couples is driven by the preponderance of workless couples: neither partner has any 
earnings). Yet in these two countries the tax-benefit system does also allocate more to women 
than men, increasing women’s share of income to over 40%. In the other countries it remains 
at or below 25%. 
Pre- tax-benefit incomes tend to be more equal for men and women in couples with high 
combined incomes (in the top quintile group – see Figure 4), and the tax-benefit systems have 
a rather small but mostly positive equalising effect, although the effect is very slightly 
negative in Portugal.   
Table 4 shows the absolute equalising effects of the operation of tax-benefit systems for 
different types of couple. As in Figure 1, the equalising effect (percentage point increase in 
women’s share of income) declines with the level of combined couple disposable income 
(except in Greece, where the effect is always small). The effect is larger than average in all 
countries for couples where the woman does not have her own earnings, and negative where 
only the women is earning (except in Italy where the result is based on a limited number of 
observations with women earning a small amount and men in receipt of un-earned income). 
Where neither partner is earning, the effect is quite variable, increasing the man’s income 
share under some systems (Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy) and reducing it in others (France, 
the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK).
12 Greater equalisation takes place among couples with 
dependent children and for those aged under 40. This is consistent with some proportion of 
                                                 
12 These results are based on small numbers of observations and are not statistically significant in some cases.    13 
the equalisation taking place through the operation of family benefits, maternity benefits and 
tax concessions for children.  
In more than half of the countries, the equalising effect is stronger for married couples than 
for unmarried ones (France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal and the UK). Joint tax 
systems tend to result in smaller tax burden differences between the higher and lower-earning 
partners. Because joint assessment is generally limited to married couples, we might expect 
smaller equalising effects for married couples in countries where income tax systems are 
joint. Under our assumption that tax liability is split proportionally to taxable income, this 
does not seem to be so in all cases. The countries with joint taxation of some form are France, 
Germany and Portugal, all countries where married couples are subject to more equalisation 
than unmarried couples. There could of course be other factors at work since there may be 
other differences between married and unmarried couples explaining this unexpected effect 
(if, for example, unmarried couples are less likely to have children). The next section 
considers the equalising role of each part of the tax-benefit system.  
6. The equalising properties of individual policy components  
Assessing the contribution to equalisation of each component of the tax-benefit system is of 
interest, especially since it is relevant to the design of policies to reduce gender inequalities. 
We consider income taxes, social contributions and benefits categorised as means-tested and 
non means-tested benefits. However, such an assessment is not straightforward. This is 
because, firstly, there is some interaction between components of the system. We have chosen 
to assess equalisation in terms of the absolute increase in the female share of income. If there 
are interactions, for example if there are benefits that are taxable, then the order of calculation 
matters.
13  We start with independent pre- tax-benefit incomes (labelled (1) in Table 5) and 
add non means-tested benefits (2). Table 5 shows the percentage point equalisation (increase 
in female share) due to these benefits. The next stages are to add means-tested benefits (3), 
deduct contributions (4) and deduct income taxes (5). The final row shows the woman’s share 
of disposable income as in Table 3 and the sum of the components of equalisation, (2), (3), 
(4) and (5) is the same as the overall equalisation shown in Table 4. A negative sign indicates 
that the income component has the effect of increasing the male share.  
                                                 
13 This analysis shares some of the issues associated with decomposing the distributional properties of taxes and 
benefits systems across the income distribution (rather than within couples). See Immervoll et al. (2006) for a 
discussion of some of these issues, as well as an empirical analysis using EUROMOD.    14 
Table 5 shows the decomposition for all couples in our sample and for those in the bottom 
and top quintile groups of the distribution of household disposable incomes. The same 
information is plotted in Figure 5. Looking first at the average picture, it is notable how 
variable are the contributions of each component across countries. Non means-tested benefits 
have a relatively large equalising effect in Finland, France and also Austria and the UK, as 
well as making up a large proportion of the total effect in Germany. They only have a small 
impact in Greece and Italy and a negative effect on women’s income shares in the 
Netherlands and Portugal. The net effect of these benefits depends very much on the balance 
between different types of benefit in payment e.g. parental benefits (received 
disproportionately by women), unemployment benefits (received disproportionately by men 
in many countries) and child and family benefits (shared equally, by assumption). Means-
tested benefits play a large role in Austria, Italy and Portugal. Interestingly, they are less 
important in the UK, in spite of means-tested benefits playing a large role in the system as a 
whole. Contributions play a small positive role in most countries although the effect is 
negative in Germany. In this case women in couples pay a higher proportion of their income 
in contributions than do men, largely because of the operation of an upper limit on 
contributions.  The positive effect in Austria is relatively large, reflecting the high proportion 
of male earner only couples as well as a significant number of female earners with earnings 
below the contributions threshold. The effect is very large in the Netherlands, where 
contribution burdens are large and low-earning individuals can receive a refunded tax credit 
through the “people’s insurance” part of the Netherlands contribution system.
14 Progressive 
income taxes reduce within-couple inequalities in all countries although the effect is relatively 
small in the joint taxation countries (Portugal especially and also France and Germany).  
In the bottom quintile of household income (Figure 5b) there is more equalisation than on 
average (except in Greece) and, not surprisingly, less of a role is played by income tax 
(except in Italy) and more by benefits. Means-tested benefits have a particularly important 
equalising effect in Portugal, UK, Italy and Austria and France (and proportionally, in 
Greece). Non means-tested benefits are important in redistributing towards women in Austria, 
Finland and France, but have a negative role in the Netherlands and Portugal. 
At the top end of the household income distribution (Figure 5c) there is less equalisation 
generally and the net effect is very small in France, Germany, Italy and Portugal. Income 
                                                 
14 Arguably, this refund could also be considered as a benefit.   15 
taxes are the most important instrument (except in Portugal) and contributions, where they 
have an effect, play a de-equalising role due to the operation of upper contribution limits on 
higher incomes. 
To summarise: 
•  The extent of within couple income equalisation achieved by tax benefit systems 
varies considerably across countries, narrowing the gap between male and female 
shares by more than 4 percentage points in Austria and less than 1 percentage point in 
Greece.  
•  Non means-tested benefits, including universal family benefits, as well as insurance-
based out-of-work benefits, can have a positive or negative effect on women’s share 
of income, depending on who is most likely to receive them. Their effect is 
particularly large and positive in Finland and France and negative in the Netherlands 
and Portugal.  
•  Means tested benefits play a larger role at lower incomes and contribute most to 
equalisation in the bottom quintile in all countries considered except Finland, 
Germany and the Netherlands. 
•  Income taxes reduce within-couple inequalities, particularly at higher incomes and 
particularly in countries operating largely individual income tax systems: Austria, 
Finland, the Netherlands and the UK. 
•  Contributions tend to be progressive at lower earnings levels (due to the contribution 
thresholds) and regressive for earnings close to the contribution ceiling. Accordingly, 
they can play a (small) equalising role at lower incomes but can exacerbate gender 
inequalities at high incomes.  
Income taxes, contributions and means-tested benefits all affect the income gain that can be 
achieved through working at all, or working longer or harder. The following two sections 
consider whether the countries that achieve significant equalisation within couples do so at 
the expense of damaging women’s work incentives relative to those of their male partners. 
7. Within-household gender differences in work incentives    16 
Decisions about how much to work have a number of different dimensions. Within couples 
there are not only individual factors but also issues that couples may consider jointly. In a 
manner that is consistent with the analysis in the preceding part of this paper we consider the 
implications for couple income of various labour market choices that one or other of the 
couple members might make. We consider three types of work-related decisions. In the first 
case we ask how a standard marginal proportional increase in earnings (3%, roughly 
corresponding to the earnings for an extra hour per week of full-time work) is treated by the 
tax-benefit systems in its effect on household disposable income. This, conventionally 
calculated, Marginal Effective Tax Rate (METR) tells us about the incentives of each partner 
in two-earner couples to work a little more but does not account for the fact that in many 
couples the man has higher earnings. Thus the marginal increase in earnings tends to be worth 
more to the couple if it is the man that increases his work effort. It may simply be the higher 
wage rates rather than the tax-benefit effects that provide better incentives for the man to 
increase the amount worked.
15  
To measure the size of the effect of differential pre- tax-benefit incomes we pose the question 
how much of an increase in earnings is necessary for each partner in order to increase the 
couple disposable income by 10%. This is intended to be illustrative of the type of aspiration 
that many couples may have, for example to afford a larger house or to meet debt re-
payments. How much increase in effort is necessary by the woman compared with the man to 
achieve the same increase in joint disposable income?  
The following section considers the third type of decision: the incentives of women in couples 
with earning partners to take paid work themselves. This is done by calculating Participation 
Tax Rates (PTRs) which quantify the proportion of the lost earnings that is compensated by 
lower taxes and contributions and higher benefits when not in paid work. 
The distribution of METRs for a margin of 3% of individual earnings is given in Appendix 
Table A3, with the modal range highlighted, and the gender and country differences are 
summarised in Table 6.
16 The difference in the average METR for men and women in couples 
                                                 
15 In principle there may also be effects on the measured METR because the margin itself is of different absolute 
size for members of the couple. We also consider the effect on household disposable income of couple earnings 
increasing by 10%, with the total increment being added in turn to each of the man and woman’s earnings, 
making the absolute size the same (although larger than the 3% increase considered for the METR). We find 
very little difference in the size of the mean effective marginal rates when calculated in this way.  
16 See Immervoll (2004) for more detail about calculations of this type.   17 
is expressed in absolute terms as percentage point difference. Positive values indicate a higher 
METR – and hence worse work incentives - for women in the group on average. In all the 
independent tax countries the women on average face lower METRs, and hence less 
disincentive to work a little more, than their male partners. This advantage is largest in 
Austria (7 percentage points difference in METR on average) and similar (4-5 percentage 
points) in the other five countries. In contrast, women are in a worse position than their 
partners in all three joint taxation countries, Portugal, France and Germany. The discrepancy, 
however, is not large (just one percentage point in Portugal and France, and two points in 
Germany). Again, these averages obscure the variation within countries. 
Women have less of a tendency than men to face very high effective marginal rates, which are 
here defined as more than 50%. In the countries with higher tax rates overall (Finland, 
Germany and the Netherlands) this is largely a reflection of men facing higher marginal 
income tax rates rather than the effects of benefit withdrawal. In Germany, where high tax 
rates are combined with joint taxation, women outnumber men in facing rates over 50% (56% 
compared with 48%). In Finland, with an individual tax system, men greatly outnumber 
women in facing high METRs (37% compared with 12%). In the UK, where high METRs are 
explained by means-tested benefit withdrawal in combination with tax and contribution 
deductions, the risk of a high rate is similar for men and women.  
Aside from the effects of joint taxation, there does not seem to be a generalised problem of 
the tax and benefit system damaging female work incentives more than those of men. It is 
nevertheless possible that significant gender disparities may exist within couples. Indeed, 
within-couple differences of work incentives are the most relevant aspect of work incentives 
when considering activity patterns and divisions of labour within households. 
 In some countries men and women in two-earner couples do tend to face similar METRs as 
each other: in France all but 27% and in Portugal all but 20% (Table 6). A significant 
minority of women face rates more than 5 percentage points higher than their partners in all 
countries, ranging from 26% in Germany to 9% in the Netherlands. However, with the 
exception of the joint taxation countries larger proportions of men have METRs more than 5 
percentage points higher than their female partners. These proportions range from 56% in 
Austria to 36% in the UK.     18 
The absence of a disadvantaging treatment of female additional earnings is also confirmed 
looking at differences in incentives to earn a little more within couple. There are some high 
METRs, but, with the exception of the joint taxation countries, these are as likely to be faced 
by men in the case of the two-earner couples we consider. If, for example, a couple is 
deciding between themselves which one should take on more paid work, it does not appear 
that the tax benefit systems of the countries we consider place particular obstacles in the way 
of the woman. The fact that she will typically earn less for the same extra time worked, and 
that any additional responsibilities outside the household will leave her less time for activities 
within it are much more likely to be factors that affect any such decision. Indeed, it is only by 
virtue of these differences that the tax-benefit system could have a differential effect.  
In order to establish what differences there are in members of couples to earn a little more we 
consider what return the household would receive on each of them increasing the amount they 
earn. Imagine a couple that wished to increase their household disposable income by 10%. 
One factor in choosing which of them should work more is their rate of pay and the 
proportional increase in time (or effort in other ways) that they would need to spend working. 
Another is the relative degree to which the tax-benefit system taxes or withdraws the 
additional earnings. Table 6 shows the proportional increase in earned income that would be 
necessary for each of them individually to achieve the 10% increase. The median rather than 
the mean of this variable is shown because very large amounts of earnings, which distort the 
mean, are necessary to achieve the target increase in household disposable income in some 
circumstances. These arise where (a) there is a large discrepancy between the earnings of the 
couple and/or (b) the withdrawal rate within the tax-benefit system requires a large increase in 
earnings to achieve a small increase in disposable income (the “poverty trap”). As a measure 
of the relative importance of such cases across countries, Table 6 shows the proportion of 
individuals where a 50% increase in earnings is not sufficient to result in a 10% increase in 
disposable income. Relatively large proportions of women in two earner couples are in this 
situation ranging from 42% in Germany to 17% in Portugal. Not unexpectedly smaller 
proportions of men are affected: as low as 3% in the Netherlands and Austria up to 11% in 
Finland and 8% in Greece and the UK. 
The median increase in male earnings necessary to achieve a 10% increase in couple 
disposable income is quite similar across all countries: between 26.4% in Finland and 19.4%   19 
in the UK.
17 There is more variation in the median necessary increase in female earnings 
which in every country is larger than the median for men. This ranges from 28.9% in Portugal 
and 30.1% in France up to 42.3% in Germany and 41.6% in Austria. The ratio at the median 
of the proportional extra earnings required from women relative to men is lowest in Finland 
where part-time working by women is relatively rare, but still over 1.3. The ratio is highest in 
the Netherlands (2.1) and Austria (1.9).  
To summarise, it seems that the main effects of tax-benefit systems on the relative incentives 
of men and women in couples to increase their work effort are via the income tax system and 
in particular whether it taxes couple income jointly or individually. Joint taxation results in 
worse incentives on the intensive margin for the lower-earning member of the two-earner 
couple (France, Germany and Portugal). This is usually the woman and, as we have also seen, 
it is the discrepancy in couple wage rates and hours of work that drives our finding that for 
the couple to increase their disposable income it makes most sense in most cases for the man 
to increase his effort rather than the woman. This apparently self-perpetuating imbalance 
between couple earnings seems particularly strong in Austria, Germany and the Netherlands 
and less so in Portugal, France and Finland. 
8. Incentives to work for women as second earners 
A longstanding policy concern in many countries is the incentive to work at all. For women in 
couples the issues are less about the level of generosity of out-of-work social protection 
systems as such, than they are about the effect of their potential earned income on the taxes 
and benefits of the couple. On the one hand, the partners of unemployed men have little 
incentive to take paid work themselves if the benefits he receives are assessed on her income 
as well as his they will be reduced with her earnings. On the other hand, work entry by the 
partners of earning men may be accompanied by loss of in-work jointly-assessed benefits or 
the taxation of her earnings from the first euro earned. It is this latter issue that we consider as 
it is particularly relevant to the maintenance of family incomes at a level that is adequate 
when the earning capacity of one partner (in this case the man) is not high. It is also relevant 
to gender equality in maintaining human capital and earning opportunities. To assess the 
effect of tax-benefit systems on incentives to be in paid work for women with partners in 
work we calculate Participation Tax Rates (PTRs): the proportion of the lost earnings that is 
                                                 
17 More than 10% is needed in part because of the effects of the tax-benefit system and in part because the   20 
compensated by lower taxes and contributions and higher benefits after leaving paid work. 
The basis of such calculations is explained in Immervoll and O’Donoghue (2002). The 
calculations are carried out for women in two-earner couples, by simulating what happens to 
their income on leaving work under two assumptions: that they qualify in full for contributory 
unemployment benefits, and that they do not. The second assumption can also be interpreted 
as what happens in the longer run after any eligibility for contributory benefits has been 
exhausted. Showing to what extent the tax-benefit system replaces lost earnings, the PTRs tell 
us what would happen if the woman did leave work, and hence the incentive she has to work 
as she does.  
The top panel of Table 7 shows PTRs for three of the nine countries considered in this paper: 
Austria, Italy and UK, that are traditionally characterized by very different systems of social 
protection. Women in the UK seem to face better incentives to work both in the short (only 
35% of lost earnings are replaced by the tax-benefit system) and long run. At the opposite 
extreme, in Austria the income insurance provided by the tax-benefit system is higher, 
particularly if the woman receives unemployment benefits that guarantee half of the lost 
earnings. 
In order to assess the incentives to participate into the labour market, it is also important to 
consider the reverse situation of women observed to not be in work and assuming they move 
into work. In this case the PTRs tell us the proportion of the woman’s gross earnings that is 
deducted as taxation and contributions and lost in out-of-work benefits on entry into work. In 
principle the PTRs calculated for each direction of the transition (in to out of work, and out of 
work to in) are trying to capture the same thing. However, in practice we only observe each 
woman in one state or the other and which this is depends on, among other things, the 
underlying incentive structure and the woman’s potential earnings. In the case of the move 
into work, their earnings are predicted on the basis of those received by women currently in 
work corrected for sample selection bias, using Heckman selection-corrected wage 
regressions.
18 Generally these predicted earnings are lower than those actually received by 
women observed to be in work. Therefore, PTRs calculated for the in-to-out transition are not 
the same as those for the out-to-in transition. Both are needed to give a balanced picture of the 
incentives to take paid work. 
                                                                                                                                                          
increase in income arises from just one partner’s earnings. 
18 Regression coefficients are shown in appendix table A4.    21 
The bottom panel of Table 7 shows the PTRs for women living in couples with a partner who 
is earning and being themselves either unemployed or inactive.
19 In Austria and Italy, the 
incentive for moving into employment is on average much higher for inactive women than for 
those unemployed.
20 In Italy, where the income support provided by the tax-benefit system is 
generally low, the incentive to work is quite high: only 22% of the earnings would be taxed 
away on average by the tax-benefit system.  
In the UK, given the low level and short duration of unemployment benefits, the incentive to 
start working is very similar for women who are unemployed or inactive. In the latter case the 
incentive is, however lower compared to the other countries. Part of the explanation lies in the 
relatively sizeable system of in-work benefits. These may be received based on the man’s 
employment and earnings. On her entry into paid work the woman’s earnings result in 
withdrawal of these benefits which are assessed on joint income. In our sample of UK couples 
as a whole 21% are entitled to one or more in-work benefits.
21 For the one-earner couples that 
are considered for the inactivity-to-employment transition by the woman, 48% are entitled to 
such benefits before the transition and face their partial or complete withdrawal on 
employment.  
9. Conclusions: is there a within-couple trade off?  
Of those we consider, the countries with the tax-benefit systems that do most to equalise 
couple incomes are Austria, Finland, the UK and France. Figure 2, discussed above, 
summarises the differences across countries in the extent of equalisation, given the level of 
within-couple inequality in pre-tax benefit incomes. Figure 6 focuses on the position of two-
earner couples, the group for whom we have assessed work incentives along the intensive 
margin as well as the extensive margin for women as second earners (from in-work to out-of-
work). In this case, the pre- tax and benefit incomes are more equally distributed and the four 
countries achieving the most equalisation are Austria, Finland, the UK and the Netherlands.  
We have seen that these are also the countries where the income tax system contributes 
particularly to within couple equalisation. They are all countries with individual tax systems. 
                                                 
19 A woman is classified as being unemployed if she receives unemployment benefit income and she does not 
have any in-work income. She is considered inactive if she does not have any unemployment or in-work income 
and if she is not in education. 
20 These results should be interpreted with caution given the limited number of observation on which they are 
based. 
21 Working Families Tax Credit, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit   22 
It is the joint tax countries (France, Germany and Portugal) where there seems to be a 
discernable disadvantage introduced through the tax-benefit system to (earning) women 
compared with their (earning) partners in the incentive to work more intensively. In general it 
is the lower earnings of women than their partners that drive within-couple differences in 
work incentives. When viewed as a couple decision about who should work more to achieve a 
higher couple disposable income there are clear advantages in terms of extra proportional 
effort (at the median) in the man, rather than the woman, doing more.  
In terms of the design of tax-benefit systems there does not appear to be any systematic trade 
off between the gender equalising properties of the tax-benefit systems in the countries we 
have considered, and their effects on the relative incentives to increase the amount of paid 
work. Such a trade off seems to be relevant only for the decision for a woman to work at all. 
As expected, in countries where the level of out-of-work support is lower (as in Italy), the 
incentive for a woman to take paid work is much higher. Furthermore, where in-work support 
for low earnings is substantial as in the UK, the incentive for the partners of low earning men 
to take work themselves is relatively low. This is due to the joint couple income assessment of 
these benefits. As with joint income tax assessment, this reduces work incentives for the 
“second” earner. Joint income tax also reduces the within couple redistributive power of the 
tax-benefit system whereas this does not seem to be the case for jointly assessed means-tested 
benefits which play an important equalising role (Figure 5) based on the incidence 
assumptions that have been adopted in this paper. Assuming something apart from equal 
sharing of these sources of income would affect this result. Nevertheless, while there may be 
a degree of trade-off between the within-couple equalising and work incentive effects of 
means-tested benefits, this is not the case for joint taxation systems, which have a negative 
impact on both counts.  
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Table 1: The samples of couples: of working age, in households without other adults  
 
   Austria Finland France  Germany  Greece  Italy Netherlands  Portugal  UK 
Sample  size  (unweighted)  748  4142 4439 2626 1818 2850  1981  1507 2334 
% of all households  27.6%  30.1%  36.2%  28.1%  36.0%  35.1% 42.6% 34.4%  34.4% 
% of all couples  45.6%  55.4%  57.6%  55.5%  47.1%  48.3% 69.4% 42.7%  58.4% 
Sample characteristics             
Without  children  36.4% 48.4% 36.6% 51.0%  33.3%  33.1% 49.8% 33.8%  49.3% 
With  children  63.6% 51.6% 63.4% 49.0%  66.7%  66.9% 50.2% 66.2%  50.7% 
Older partner aged under 40  53.6%  55.6%  54.8% 48.3% 46.4% 48.7% 52.1% 53.7%  52.8% 
Older partner aged 40+  46.4%  44.4%  45.2% 51.7% 53.6% 51.3%  47.9%  46.3% 47.2% 
Man only earning  34.9%  9.6%  28.1%  21.9%  57.9%  44.8% 22.2% 24.7%  20.5% 
Woman only earning  2.4%  3.4%  3.0%  3.1%  2.0%  3.3% 5.0% 2.7%  7.3% 
Both  earning  60.2% 85.3% 65.9% 73.1%  38.1%  47.9% 65.7% 71.0%  61.1% 
Neither  earning  2.6% 1.6% 3.0% 1.8%  1.9%  4.0% 7.1% 1.6%  11.1% 
Not  married  11.7% 35.2% 20.2% 19.5%  1.2% 1.2% 21.8% 6.1%  21.5% 
Married  couple  88.3% 64.8% 79.8% 80.5%  98.8%  98.8% 78.2% 93.9%  78.5% 
Source: EUROMOD. Except for the first row, all results in this table are weighted using survey weights designed to correct for non-response.  
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Table 2: Women’s share of couple pre- tax-benefit incomes (%) by household income and female and male earnings quintiles 
 
   Austria  Finland  France Germany Greece  Italy  Netherlands  Portugal  UK 
All  23% 37% 28% 29% 18%  22% 27% 31%  32% 
Disposable income quintile for couples                
Q1  16% 35% 14% 21% 13%  13% 22% 17%  34% 
Q2  16% 34% 26% 25%  9%  10% 23% 29%  28% 
Q3  21% 37% 33% 31% 15%  20% 26% 33%  32% 
Q4  30% 40% 37% 36% 22%  35% 31% 40%  33% 
Q5  33% 37% 30% 32% 31%  31% 32% 38%  34% 
No female earnings  3%  8%  0% 2% 2% 1%  3%  1%  6% 
Female earnings  quintile                 
Q1  17% 23% 21% 12% 26%  29% 16% 31%  26% 
Q2  26% 38% 38% 32% 38%  40% 30% 42%  34% 
Q3  39% 45% 45% 40% 44%  44% 36% 44%  46% 
Q4  45% 47% 48% 48% 48%  45% 43% 47%  49% 
Q5  48% 50% 51% 55% 53%  49% 55% 52%  54% 
No male earnings  89%  77%  52% 70% 77% 49%  48%  78%  62% 
Male earnings quintile                       
Q1  27% 47% 31% 40% 22%  18% 38% 30%  39% 
Q2  20% 36% 30% 31% 15%  21% 25% 29%  29% 
Q3  23% 33% 31% 26% 15%  22% 25% 31%  28% 
Q4  18% 32% 25% 23% 17%  20% 19% 29%  25% 
Q5  17% 26% 18% 14% 12%  18% 14% 27%  18% 
Couples in which the woman has 
greater pre- tax-benefit income  12% 24% 19% 19% 12%  12% 16% 19%  26% 
Source: EUROMOD. Household disposable income quintiles are calculated across all couples using the modified OECD equivalence scale. 
Male and female earnings quintiles are calculated separately using the men and women who are in paid work in the whole couple sample.    26 
Table 3: Women’s share of couple disposable (post- tax-benefit) incomes (%) by household income and female and male earnings 
quintiles 
 
   Austria  Finland  France Germany Greece  Italy  Netherlands  Portugal  UK 
All  28% 41% 31% 30% 19%  24% 29% 33%  35% 
Disposable income quintile for couples                
Q1  23% 41% 23% 25% 13%  20% 26% 23%  41% 
Q2  21% 39% 29% 27% 10%  13% 25% 30%  31% 
Q3  25% 41% 36% 31% 16%  21% 29% 34%  34% 
Q4  33% 43% 38% 37% 23%  34% 33% 39%  36% 
Q5  35% 39% 31% 32% 32%  31% 33% 38%  35% 
No female earnings  12%  24%  11%  9% 3% 5%  13% 10%  21% 
Female earnings  quintile                 
Q1  21% 32% 24% 16% 26%  30% 19% 30%  26% 
Q2  31% 41% 38% 31% 39%  44% 29% 42%  36% 
Q3  40% 45% 43% 39% 45%  44% 36% 42%  46% 
Q4  45% 47% 48% 47% 49%  44% 42% 45%  49% 
Q5  47% 50% 51% 53% 54%  48% 53% 51%  54% 
No male earnings  50%  60%  44% 50% 62% 50%  36%  53%  53% 
Male earnings quintile                       
Q1  34% 49% 36% 43% 23%  23% 41% 36%  44% 
Q2  26% 42% 34% 34% 16%  23% 31% 31%  34% 
Q3  28% 38% 34% 29% 16%  23% 29% 32%  31% 
Q4  22% 37% 28% 25% 18%  21% 23% 30%  28% 
Q5  21% 32% 20% 16% 13%  19% 18% 28%  21% 
Source: EUROMOD. Household disposable income quintiles are calculated across all couples using the modified OECD equivalence scale. 
Male and female earnings quintiles are calculated separately using the men and women who are in paid work in the whole couple sample.    27 





Austria  Finland  France Germany Greece  Italy  Netherlands 
Portuga
l  UK       
All    4.1 3.8 3.1 1.4 0.9 2.0  2.5 1.3  3.2 
Disposable income quintile for couples             Q1  7.4 6.2 9.2 3.9 0.8 6.3  4.2 6.5  6.5 
  Q2  4.4 4.8 3.0 2.9 0.7 2.6  2.6 0.5  3.2 
  Q3  4.7 3.5 2.1 -0.1 1.1 0.9  3.1 0.9  2.2 
  Q4  2.9 2.2 1.0 0.2 0.8 -0.1 1.7 -1.2  2.1 
  Q5  1.8 2.3 0.6 0.2 1.2 0.3  1.4 -0.2  1.4 
Man only earning    8.6  17.3  9.4 6.9 1.2 3.7  9.7 8.1  8.4 
Woman only earning    -37.2 -21.9 -25.3 -28.1  -7.2  5.6  -26.2 -37.1  -17.6 
Both earning    3.4 3.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.4  2.0 0.5  2.2 
Neither earning    -25.5 -2.4 26.1  1.5  -9.7  -1.4  10.0 12.5  17.1 
Female earnings  quintile                                   Q1  3.6 9.0 2.6 4.2 0.0 1.6  3.1 -1.0  -0.5 
  Q2  4.7 2.5 0.0 -1.7 0.4 3.5 -0.6  -0.3  2.0 
  Q3  1.2 -0.1 -1.6 -0.6 0.6 -0.2  0.1 -2.1  -0.2 
  Q4  0.1 -0.4 -0.8 -0.8 1.0 -0.3 -0.9 -1.3  -0.1 
  Q5  -0.6 -0.5 -0.6 -2.1 0.4 -0.8  -2.0 -0.8  -0.5 
Male earnings  quintile                                      Q1  6.6 2.3 5.8 2.8 1.3 4.5  2.5 6.6  5.1 
  Q2  6  5.6 4.1 3.0 0.6 2.2  5.5 2.2  4.7 
  Q3  4.8 5.4 3.3 2.3 0.9 1.5  3.9 1.9  3.7 
  Q4  4.9 5.1 2.9 2.0 1.1 0.9  4.1 0.9  2.9 
  Q5  3.9 5.3 1.5 1.6 1.5 0.8  3.8 0.4  2.6 
Without children    -0.5 1.4 1.7 -0.5 -0.1 0.4  0.5 0.2  1.2 
With children    6.6 6.0 3.9 3.3 1.3 2.8  4.3 1.8  5.2 
Older partner aged under 40    6.2 6.2 3.7 2.1 1.2 2.8  2.9 1.4  4.2 
Older partner aged 40+    1.7 0.8 2.3 0.7 0.6 1.2  2.2 1.1  2.0 
Not married    6.1 4.2 3.0 0.3 1.3 2.5  0.7 0.8  2.6 
Married couple    3.8 3.6 3.1 1.6 0.9 2.0  3.0 1.3  3.3 
Couples with increase in female share    80% 72% 72% 65% 59% 58%  79% 73%  76% 
Couples with increase in male share    14% 27% 19% 33% 15% 26%  21% 22%  19% 
Source: EUROMOD.   28 
Table 5: Decomposition of the equalising effects by component of the tax-benefit system 
 
  Austria Finland France Germany Greece  Italy  Netherlands Portugal  UK 
All couples              
(1) Independent income  23.4%  36.7%  28.2%  29.1% 18.0% 21.9%  26.7%  31.5% 32.2% 
(2) + Non means-tested benefits  0.9ppt  2.2ppt  1.4ppt  0.9ppt  0.2ppt  0.1ppt  -0.3ppt  -0.3ppt  1.0ppt 
(3)  +  Means-tested  benefits  1.5ppt 0.4ppt 0.9ppt  0.1ppt 0.3ppt 1.3ppt  0.1ppt  1.5ppt 0.9ppt 
(4)  -  Contributions  0.6ppt 0.1ppt 0.1ppt -0.2ppt 0.0ppt 0.0ppt  1.6ppt  0.1ppt 0.2ppt 
(5)  - Income taxes  1.2ppt  1.1ppt  0.6ppt  0.5ppt  0.4ppt  0.6ppt  1.0ppt  0.0ppt  1.2ppt 
Disposable  income  27.5% 40.5% 31.2%  30.5% 18.9% 23.9%  29.2%  32.7% 35.4% 
Bottom quintile of household disposable income            
(1) Independent income  15.9%  34.5%  14.2%  21.2% 12.7% 13.3%  21.7%  16.8% 34.4% 
(2) + Non means-tested benefits  3.1ppt  4.2ppt  4.1ppt  2.1ppt  0.1ppt  0.5ppt  -1.4ppt  -0.4ppt  1.6ppt 
(3)  +  Means-tested  benefits  3.7ppt 1.5ppt 3.9ppt  1.0ppt 0.9ppt 4.3ppt  0.8ppt  6.5ppt 4.1ppt 
(4)  -  Contributions  0.9ppt 0.1ppt 0.8ppt  0.3ppt  -0.2ppt 0.0ppt  4.2ppt  0.4ppt 0.1ppt 
(5)  - Income taxes  -0.3ppt  0.4ppt  0.4ppt  0.5ppt  0.0ppt  1.6ppt  0.5ppt  0.0ppt  0.6ppt 
Disposable  income  23.4% 40.7% 23.4%  25.0% 13.5% 19.6%  25.9%  23.3% 40.8% 
Top quintile of household disposable income            
(1) Independent income  33.4%  36.9%  30.1%  32.2% 31.0% 30.9%  32.0%  37.9% 33.7% 
(2) + Non means-tested benefits  0.2ppt  0.7ppt  0.3ppt  0.2ppt  0.1ppt  0.0ppt  0.6ppt  -0.2ppt  0.2ppt 
(3)  +  Means-tested  benefits  0.2ppt 0.0ppt 0.0ppt -0.1ppt 0.0ppt 0.0ppt  0.0ppt  0.1ppt 0.0ppt 
(4)  -  Contributions  -0.2ppt  0.0ppt -0.3ppt  -0.4ppt -0.2ppt -0.1ppt  -0.7ppt  -0.1ppt -0.1ppt 
(5)  - Income taxes  1.7ppt  1.7ppt  0.6ppt  0.5ppt  1.3ppt  0.4ppt  1.5ppt  0.0ppt  1.3ppt 
Disposable  income  35.3% 39.2% 30.8%  32.3% 32.3% 31.2%  33.4%  37.7% 35.1% 
S o u r c e :   E U R O M O D              
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Table 6 Marginal effective tax rates
a (METRs) and earnings : income elasticities for men and women in two-earner couples 
 
   Austria   Finland   France   Germany   Greece   Italy   Netherlands   Portugal   UK  
    Men  Women Men Women  Men  Women Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women  Men  Women Men Women 
METR %                            
Mean  43.0 36.2 48 44.1 30.6 31.2 48 50.4 31 25.2 40 35.7 41  36  26.7  27.8 32 27.1 
Median  40  39 48 46 33  33 50 51 31 28 39 39 45 44  25  25 30 30 
% with METR >50%  10  10  37  12  3  3  48  56  0  0  5  3  14  4  1  1  3  3 
Mean within couple 
difference (women-men) 
ppts  -6.9  -4  0.6  2.2  -5.3  -4.3  -4.9 1 -5.3 
                
% couples with male>female 
METR
b   56  47  13  22  47  48  50 8 36 
                
% couples with female>male 
METR
b 13  12  14  26  19  15  9  12  10 
Proportional increase in individual earned income necessary to achieve an increase of 10% in couple disposable income        
Median  21.6 41.6 26 35.4 21.7 30.1 23 42.3 22 33.6 24 33.9 20 41.3  20.8  28.9 19 35.7 
                        
% with earnings increase > 
50%  3.0 35 11 27 6  21 5 42 8 31 7 29 3 38  5  17 8 33 
Source: EUROMOD.  
a for a 3% increase in individual earnings. 
b by more than 5 ppts.   30 
Table 7: Women’s Participation Tax Rates (PTRs) under different labour market 
transitions  
 
 Austria  Italy  UK 
Move from in-work to unemployment (with Unemployment Benefits) 
Mean 49.6  38.4  35.4 
Median 54.0  36.0  29.0 
Sample size (unweighted)  375  1262  1334 
Move from in-work to unemployment (without Unemployment Benefits) 
Mean 23.8  32.4  19.0 
Median 25.0  32.0  19.0 
Sample size (unweighted)  375  1262  1334 
      
Move from Unemployment to Employment 
Mean 68.0  34.5  41.1 
Median 54.0  30.0  31.0 
Sample size (unweighted)  42  127  41 
Move from Inactivity to Employment 
Mean 34.3  22.3  40.5 
Median 24.0  23.0  29.0 
Sample size (unweighted)  282  1311  709 
Source: EUROMOD 
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Figure 1 Women’s share of couple pre- and post- tax and benefit income and the 


































































15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%


















































Source: EUROMOD. “Error bars” show coefficients of variation of pre- and post- tax-benefit incomes.   32 
Figure 3 Women’s share of couple pre- and post- tax and benefit income and the 






















































Figure 4 Women’s share of couple pre- and post- tax and benefit income and the 
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Source: EUROMOD.   33 



























































































































































   Source: EUROMOD.   34 
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Table A1: EUROMOD datasets 
 
Country  Base Dataset for EUROMOD  Date of collection  Reference time period for incomes 
Austria  Austrian version of European Community Household Panel  1998+1999  annual 1998 
Finland  Income distribution survey   2001  annual 2001 
France  Budget de Famille  1994/5  annual 1993/4 
Germany  German Socio-Economic Panel  2001  annual 2000 
Greece  European Community Household Panel  1995  annual 1994 
Italy  Survey of Households Income and Wealth   1996  annual 1995 
Netherlands Sociaal-economisch panelonderzoek  2000  annual 1999 
Portugal  European Community Household Panel  2001  annual 2000 
UK  Family Expenditure Survey   2000/1  month in 2000/1 
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Table A2: Quintile points (in monthly euro) 
 
   Austria Finland  France  Germany  Greece  Italy  Netherlands Portugal  UK 
Disposable income quintile for couples (upper limit)         
Q1  999  1,075  944  1,123  415 595 1,083 352  1,074 
Q2  1,239  1,373  1,304  1,435  591 830 1,400 546  1,583 
Q3  1,537  1,679  1,668  1,771 795 1,162 1,736  704 2,081 
Q4  1,996  2,079  2,237 2,318 1,113 1,628  2,178  1,050 2,812 
Female earnings  quintile (upper limit)            
Q1  551  586  733 493 396 746  541  414 757 
Q2  1,015  1,295  1,344  1,225 741 1,269 1,031  514 1,331 
Q3  1,567  1,696  1,833 1,834 1,088 1,602  1,493  679  1,942 
Q4  2,216  2,122  2,444 2,546 1,460 1,948  2,058  1,372 2,805 
Male earnings quintile (upper limit)               
Q1  1,816  1,316  1,462  1,837 848 1,193 1,918  586 1,885 
Q2  2,317  1,932  1,901 2,449 1,192 1,626  2,386  753  2,605 
Q3  2,904  2,398  2,388 3,116 1,518 2,026  3,048  1,012 3,392 
Q4  3,924  3,165  3,472 4,205 2,041 2,829  3,911  1,579 4,559 
Ratio of female: male earnings quintile (upper limits)       
Q1  0.30  0.45  0.50 0.27 0.47 0.63  0.28  0.71 0.40 
Q2  0.44  0.67  0.71 0.50 0.62 0.78  0.43  0.68 0.51 
Q3  0.54  0.71  0.77 0.59 0.72 0.79  0.49  0.67 0.57 
Q4  0.56  0.67  0.70 0.61 0.72 0.69  0.53  0.87 0.62 
Source: EUROMOD.              
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Table A3: Distribution of marginal effective tax rates for men and women in 2-earner couples (%) 
 





Men Women  Men Women  Men Women Men  Women Men  Women  Men Women  Men Women Men  Women Men  Women 
<0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 3.2 2.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 3.4 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 
0  2.0  13.1  0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 4.7 3.8 2.1 3.0 0.2 0.2 1.8 1.5 1.4  10.2 
5  0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.2 3.1 5.9 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
10 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.5 1.2 1.0 1.5 4.9 0.1 0.1 4.7 2.2 0.2 0.3 
15 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.1 1.6 1.0 0.0 0.5 3.1 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0  16.0  17.9  0.1 1.0 
20  1.1 20.8 1.0  1.4  4.8  6.2  0.2  1.8 14.3  30.0  1.7 3.7 0.3 0.2 8.3 7.3 0.8 2.6 
25 0.0 0.6 1.2 2.9  18.5  21.5  0.7 1.9 1.4 7.3 1.3 1.7 2.0  22.3  25.1 22.9  7.3  8.6 
30 1.0 1.0 2.3 3.8 5.9 1.0 2.1 1.3  17.4  17.0 1.8  9.3  0.9  1.7  0.7  0.3 12.8 7.1 
35 0.8 3.8 1.2 1.8  33.2  36.5 6.9  6.2 10.1 6.8 10.6  16.1 1.1 17.2  24.1  28.1  56.6  62.6 
40  34.8  27.8 3.4  5.9 17.1  18.9 5.9  8.2  6.3  1.1 43.6  40.7  0.8 0.7 0.8 0.3 5.5 0.2 
45  27.1 12.6 12.5 31.7  7.8  5.9  11.3  6.4  29.2 25.1 12.7 10.1 58.7  47.6 15.7 15.9  8.4  3.9 
50 22.8 8.8 40.7  39.9 3.8  3.6 24.4  16.7 8.8  0.8 19.4 7.5 17.9 2.1  2.2  2.9  4.1  0.4 
55 1.8 2.1  27.2  9.1 0.6 1.0  31.5  31.0  0.4 0.0 2.3 0.7  12.5  2.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 
60 5.3 1.9 8.1 2.1 0.6 0.2  12.0  16.8  0.0 0.0 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.8 
65 0.5 0.0 1.7 0.3 0.5 0.1 2.8 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 
70 0.2 3.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.3 
75 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 
80 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
85 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 
90 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.1 
95 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 
100 1.7 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 
>100  0.5 2.1 0.5 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.6 0.5 0.0 0.5 0.1 
Total  100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 
Source: EUROMOD. Highlighted cells indicate the modal range               
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Table A4: Selection-corrected wage regressions (women) 
 Austria  Italy  UK 
  Coeff Std.  Dev. Coeff Std.  Dev. Coeff Std.  Dev. 
Earnings Equation (Hourly wage ln)           
Years  In  Education  0.016 0.006 0.037 0.008 0.048 0.003 
Years of Experience  -0.021  0.007  0.054  0.008  0.033  0.003 
Years of Experience
2  0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
Region  1       -0.137  0.052 
Region 2  -0.039  0.036      -0.007  0.045 
Region  3  -0.047 0.043 0.051 0.056 0.002 0.043 
Region 4      0.086  0.083  -0.036  0.045 
Region 5      -0.059  0.066  0.009  0.043 
Region 6      0.091  0.077  -0.018  0.054 
Region 7      -0.073  0.077  0.228  0.044 
Region 8      0.042  0.057  0.070  0.039 
Region 9      -0.031  0.063  0.002  0.043 
Region 10      -0.206  0.081  -0.093  0.052 
Region 11      -0.110  0.068  0.052  0.044 
Region 12      -0.293  0.071     
Region 13      -0.071  0.078     
Region 14      -0.100  0.192     
Region 15      -0.330  0.074     
Region 16      -0.312  0.074     
Region 17      0.029  0.150     
Region 18      -0.233  0.097     
Region 19      -0.219  0.082     
Region 20      -0.220  0.088     
Armed  forces       -0.760  0.442 
Senior officials and managers  0.375  0.106  0.900  0.170  0.496  0.032 
Professionals 0.505  0.083      0.652  0.057 
Technicians and associate 
professionals  0.319 0.055 0.739 0.049     
Clerks  0.159 0.047 0.431 0.037     
Service and sales workers  -0.065  0.044      0.119  0.023 
Skilled agricultural  -0.143  0.125      -0.088  0.113 
Craft and trades workers  -0.092  0.073  -1.521  0.376  0.491  0.029 
Plant and machine operators  -0.012  0.102         
Part-time  0.248 0.031 0.003 0.032 -0.080 0.019 
Constant  4.876 0.095 1.142 0.225 0.817 0.073 
        
Participation Equation        
Married  -0.212 0.050 -0.388 0.050  0.172 0.046 
Cohabiting  0.031 0.095 0.196 0.263 0.352 0.068 
Years  In  Education  0.041 0.008 0.085 0.005 0.070 0.006 
Years  of  Experience  0.087 0.009 0.098 0.006 0.071 0.007 
Years of Experience
2  -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 -0.002 0.000 
Regional Gender Unemployment Rate  -1.329  4.454  -2.401  0.150  -10.310  2.380 
Number of Children (aged - 0 -5)  -0.380  0.041  -0.018  0.042  -0.560  0.037 
Number of Children (aged - 6-10)  -0.189  0.040  -0.183  0.042  -0.235  0.036 
Number of Children (aged - 11-17)  -0.148  0.031  -0.066  0.034  -0.143  0.034 
Constant  -0.437 0.199 -1.108 0.108 -0.268 0.136 
           
λ  -0.745 0.023 -0.052 0.106  0.035 0.038 
No. of observations  2449  6701  5154 
Censored  observations  1280 4189 2306 
Uncensored  observations  1169 2512 2848 
Wald (c
2, 9)  371.9  1596.07  1477.37 
Prob > c
2  0 0 0 
Source: Authors’ calculations.       